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Dynamic Vs. Static Analysis, Together With What The Us Shale Together With Technology Sectors Bring Inward Common

Over the yesteryear decade, few industries convey incinerated equally much shareholder working capital missive of the alphabet equally the the States shale fossil oil in addition to gas (O&G) sector. Attracted yesteryear the substantial technology-driven structural growth chance the sector promised, in addition to its putatively depression costs in addition to attractive well-level IRRs much-touted yesteryear management, investors initially flocked to the sector, but convey since been badly burned, equally losses convey mounted; debt levels skyrocketed; in addition to percentage prices plummeted.

Investors were correct nearly 1 affair though - the States shale has been a remarkable secular growth story. New engineering scientific discipline has unlocked vast novel reservoirs of fossil oil in addition to gas, in addition to propelled the the States from beingness a pregnant meshwork importer of O&G to directly beingness a growing meshwork exporter (the the States is silent a meshwork importer of oil, but is directly a meshwork exporter of gas, primarily via newly-commissioned LNG projects), spell also restoring the the States to the station of the world's largest fossil oil producer. However, spell investors were correct nearly the growth potential, they convey been incorrect nearly the profitability outlook, in addition to equally a result, convey realised considerable losses, this tremendous structural growth story notwithstanding.

So what has happened exactly? Given that well-costs are depression in addition to IRRs putatively so high (often claimed to last >50%), why hasn't the sector delivered improve outcomes for investors? I hope to explicate why inwards this post, in addition to inwards the procedure also explicate (1) the perils of static vs. dynamic analysis; in addition to (2) why the sense of the shale sector genuinely has a lot of relevance to the much-hyped, loss-making tech sector - sectors most believe convey cypher whatsoever inwards common. I believe the latter could good last heading for a pregnant fallout on par amongst what has/is directly happening inwards shale.

The fundamental work amongst abide by to the shale companies has been this: spell it is truthful that the shale companies convey attractive well-level unit economic science (i.e. if you lot compare the marginal costs of good completion in addition to production vs. the marginal cash menstruation such wells generate from production sales, the IRR on that marginal working capital missive of the alphabet spending is indeed attractive), at that spot are also rattling considerable support costs that demand to last laid off against that 'contribution margin'.

You demand to purchase or lease land; drill out that ground in addition to evidence upwardly reserves; create a bunch of processing in addition to logistics infrastructure (or sign contracts amongst 3rd parties to provide such infrastructure); in addition to you lot demand to finance all of that expenditure upfront, oftentimes through the exercise of a pregnant amount of interest-bearing debt. In addition, you lot demand to absorb all the diverse corporate primal caput business office costs associated amongst running a large organisation in addition to publicly listed fellowship - a C-suite doesn't come upwardly cheap. All of this costs money. Consequently, spell it is truthful that the well-level IRRs touted yesteryear management convey been high, the all-in returns on working capital missive of the alphabet afterward all of these back upwardly costs (which are relatively fixed) are included convey been rattling poor, in addition to oftentimes below the cost of debt. This is why the well-level IRRs management convey touted to investors for so long convey borne piffling to no relation to their reported GAAP earnings/ROICs.

So what exercise you lot exercise if you lot convey attractive marginal unit of measurement economic science amongst high incremental IRRs, but large fixed back upwardly costs that are overwhelming those unit-level returns? You increment volume. This ought to piece of work right? After all, the marginal unit of measurement economic science are demonstrably attractive, whereas the back upwardly costs are relatively fixed (or at to the lowest degree scale less chop-chop than volume). As you lot ramp upwardly your drilling & completion in addition to increment production, the amount of contribution margin ought to rise, in addition to economies of scale in addition to grouping profitability volition kicking in, right? As volumes rise, grouping ROIC should tendency closer to well-level IRRs, equally fixed costs shrink equally a proportion to full revenue, right?

Wrong. The work amongst this perspective is that it relies on what I volition telephone yell upwardly 'static analysis' rather than 'dynamic analysis'. Static analysis holds everything else inwards Blue Planet constant, in addition to assumes cypher changes inwards the futurity or is whatever agency influenced yesteryear the deportment of either yourself or whatever of your electrical flow or futurity competitors. If you lot exercise static analysis, you lot volition conclude - seemingly reasonably - that if you lot drill out to a greater extent than wells in addition to create to a greater extent than fossil oil in addition to gas at high incremental IRRs, spell back upwardly costs stay relatively fixed, you lot volition inevitably larn rattling profitable.

The work is that inwards the existent world, the world is dynamic non static. All else is non held constant, in addition to the actions in addition to reaction-functions of economical actors focusing on the micro-level factors inwards their ain businesses tin modify emergent macro factors inwards unanticipated ways. In the instance of the shale sector, what genuinely happened dynamically is that equally private shale O&G producers pushed to ramp upwardly volumes inwards social club to heighten fixed-cost absorption, the render of fossil oil in addition to gas chop-chop increased, which resulted inwards a pregnant pass upwardly inwards O&G prices. Every unmarried producer held every other producers' deportment constant, in addition to assumed only their ain would change, in addition to what was rational at the grade of the private turned out to last irrational at the grade of the collective.

Producers were initially thinking, nosotros are producing from 50 wells, in addition to if nosotros larn that upwardly to 100 wells, based on the dandy unit-level good economic science nosotros are currently seeing, in addition to our electrical flow back upwardly cost structure, nosotros volition last able to brand decent returns, so lets force production upwardly to 100 wells. However, yesteryear the fourth dimension production hitting 100 wells, commodity prices had fallen, such that contribution margins per good had fallen to offset the book gain, amongst well-level IRRs falling from (perhaps) 60% to 30%. So what exercise they directly do? They say, good gee it's unfortunate - we've worked genuinely difficult in addition to made dandy operational progress, but the 'external environment' has proven less favourable than expected. Never take away heed - if nosotros are able to catch 200 wells instead of 100, nosotros volition last able to brand upwardly for the pass upwardly inwards well-level IRRs, which afterward all are silent quite attractive. We just demand to grow a flake to a greater extent than than nosotros idea to 'make it upwardly on volume'. So they ramp production upwardly further. The problem? This farther exacerbates the grade of oversupply, in addition to pushes commodity prices fifty-fifty lower. This is how the entire shale manufacture has works life itself - to borrow Jim Chanos' wonderful phrase - on a 'treadmill to hell'.

This perfectly explains why the States shale O&G producers convey remained so hell-bent on increasing production volumes over the yesteryear decade, despite falling commodity prices (it is to a large extent because of falling commodity prices). A lay observer mightiness last inclined to ask, why on globe are shale producers rushing to create equally much of their non-renewable reserves equally fast equally possible inwards such a depression pricing environment? Why non just sit down on the valuable resources in addition to hold back for a improve pricing environment? The response is that they convey rattling considerable fixed costs (including debt servicing), in addition to they volition thus bleed to expiry if they wait. They demand whatever contribution margin they tin larn to seek to defray these fixed costs. Contrary to pop opinion, it is thus non purely a portion of the companies beingness run yesteryear a bunch of 'oil men' who just desire to 'drill infant drill' because they similar drilling. It's due to economical necessity, because the choice is bankruptcy.

Now what I let out most interesting nearly the to a higher house is that at that spot is to a greater extent than or less other sector at acquaint suffering from precisely the same economical forces, in addition to the fallacies associated amongst static vs. dynamic analysis: the loss-making technology/software sector - peculiarly Unicorns funded yesteryear VC (note, this does not include technology/software companies amongst concern models that are proven to last profitable, although such companies tin silent last harmed yesteryear the actions of other manufacture actors, inwards much the same agency profitable O&G companies convey been harmed yesteryear the shale sector). There are many listed examples equally well, however, such equally companies similar Wayfair, Uber, in addition to Carvana. (Indeed, my recent post on Afterpay uses a dynamic analysis to counter the prevailing bullish narrative that is based primarily on a static analysis; most of the considerable criticism I received for the slice from APT bulls on Twitter also used arguments grounded inwards static analysis).

While on the surface, fast growing but loss-making tech companies mightiness seem to convey piffling inwards mutual amongst the States shale producers, the economical parallels are genuinely quite striking. The only deviation is that the marketplace is currently ruby-red hot on fast-growing tech companies, regardless of the electrical flow nation of the P&L, because investors are silent using static rather than dynamic analysis to assess their prospects, much equally they were many years agone to assess the prospects of shale producers, prior to the sector's recent implosion.

The similarities are equally follows: Investors - at the management of fellowship managements - are focused almost alone on revenue/volume growth in addition to the unit economics, or contribution margin associated amongst additional volumes. The grade of back upwardly costs, including corporate overhead, R&D, in addition to marketing etc, are mostly ignored, equally is the aggregate grade of grouping losses such back upwardly costs are occasioning. This is how companies similar Wayfair convey been able to multi-bag despite reporting larger in addition to larger losses equally they convey grown. The back upwardly costs are seen yesteryear investors equally beingness largely irrelevant, equally it is believed they volition shrink inwards relative size over fourth dimension equally revenue growth in addition to contribution margin most assuredly continues to rise. Indeed, it is oftentimes argued that you lot should value companies similar Wayfair on a multiple of gross lucre (even Bill Miller has made this argument).

Uber, for instance, advertises extensively inwards its presentation materials the dandy 'contribution margin' it makes on its ride business. However, notwithstanding the putatively fabulous unit of measurement economic science the fellowship enjoys, the fellowship silent loses nearly US$1bn a quarter a decade or so afterward its founding. It turns out R&D, marketing, client service, in addition to the diverse other back upwardly costs necessary to sustain operations are quite expensive (incidentally, at that spot are almost no companies inwards Blue Planet that don't convey robustly positive gross margins in addition to merchandise at depression multiple of gross profit; investors exterior of tech exercise non facial expression at gross lucre multiples because they are aware that without the associated SG&A costs, those gross profits in addition to contribution margin could non last delivered).

Like amongst shale, if 1 uses static analysis, you lot tin create a bull instance for these stocks despite the electrical flow nation of their P&Ls, because you lot tin fighting that equally these companies scale volumes in addition to contribution margin off a back upwardly cost base of operations that volition grow less chop-chop than revenue, pregnant operating leverage volition kicking inwards downwardly the track. If you lot concur everything else constant, including inwards detail the actions non only of electrical flow but also futurity competitors, so the bull instance is plausible.

The work though is that - equally was the instance amongst shale - Blue Planet is dynamic non static, in addition to you lot cannot concur everything else constant. It is equally naive for these companies in addition to their investors to believe that the residue of Blue Planet - including the many well-resourced incumbents many of these companies seek to disrupt - volition sit down idly dorsum in addition to allow the said fellowship to capture a large TAM ('total addressable market') uncontested, equally it was for shale producers to believe that their ain pregnant ramping upwardly of volumes would non impact terminate commodity prices.

In reality, equally to a greater extent than tech companies amongst dandy 'unit economics' but large overall losses endeavour to drive revenue/volume growth to increment 'contribution margin', recoup fixed costs, in addition to hence pursue a 'path to profitability', what is probable to ambit (and indeed already is) is that competitive intensity volition significantly increment in addition to drive a pass upwardly inwards contribution margins that offset that book growth. This tin manifest non just inwards the shape of outright cost discounting, but also escalating client acquisition costs, in addition to the increasing prevalence of diverse promotional offerings (including 'free delivery' in addition to the like), which are sometimes included below the gross lucre describe (e.g. Uber's 'driver incentives'). While the companies no dubiety couch such offers inwards terms of 'enhanced client value' in addition to 'driving engagement', inwards reality it is simply a shape of discounting; the phrase 'buying marketplace share' has long existed inwards business, in addition to this iteration is no different.

There is no surer sign this is happening that when the companies maintain to force out their jurist for when they volition ambit pause even/profitability, or meet profitability/margins pass upwardly fifty-fifty though volumes are rising, equally has of late occurred amongst Wayfair. And fifty-fifty hitherto profitable companies tin last adversely affected. Take Latin American e-commerce fellowship MercadoLibra, for instance. A few years back, the fellowship was robustly profitable in addition to making operating margins of to a greater extent than or less 20%. Today it is to a greater extent than similar -10%. Why? Because at that spot are several rattling aggressive competing e-commerce companies attempting to ramp volumes to recoup fixed costs, in addition to just similar inwards whatever industry, it is difficult to last smarter than your dumbest competitor. It is no dissimilar from profitable incumbent fossil oil companies suffering declining profitability because a bunch of shale companies are desperately trying to ramp upwardly volumes in addition to 'contribution margin' to comprehend their fixed costs.

The only deviation is that instead of investors seeing what is happening for what it is - a cost state of war that is a symptom of excess supply/competition in addition to ugly manufacture economic science akin to the airline manufacture inwards eras yesteryear - they are instead content to believe the fiction that this is primarily an 'investment inwards futurity growth' in addition to beingness 'long term greedy'. In reality, these companies are losing coin for the same ground shale producers are - at that spot is also much render because also many companies in addition to also much working capital missive of the alphabet jumped into the sector to capitalise on 'secular growth'.

After the 2000-03 dot.com bust, people widely questioned how it was that so many smart investors managed to convince themselves that the normal laws of economic science did non apply to meshwork companies. Well, something rattling similar is happening today. Tech investors are content to pay outrageously high prices for engineering scientific discipline companies because they believe they are immune from the normal prosaic forces of render in addition to demand, in addition to that both competition (both electrical flow in addition to future) in addition to a rapid influx of working capital missive of the alphabet into the manufacture volition non drive downwardly returns inwards the agency it has inwards the yesteryear in every manufacture in addition to inwards every instance it has always occurred, just equally the laws of economic science would predict.

LTV/CAC metrics provide deceptive comfort to companies/investors nearly the wisdom of incurring hundreds of millions of dollars of losses inwards social club to grow, because they assume that the LTV is locked inwards rather than just a hypothetical based on a static analysis of how things facial expression today, rather than a dynamic analysis of how LTV could facial expression inwards the future, in addition to evolve inwards an surroundings of increasingly saturated markets in addition to to a greater extent than in addition to to a greater extent than competitors desperately trying to ramp upwardly volumes to recoup fixed costs. It is precisely analogous to shale O&G companies assuming that their efforts at rapid book growth would convey no impact on the terminate commodity price. After all, the LTV of their wells were rattling high relative to their WAC (well acquisition costs). So what could buy the farm wrong? Why shouldn't investors value them based on LTV/WAC metrics?

As I convey argued for to a greater extent than or less fourth dimension now, I intend a fairly epic bust inwards the engineering scientific discipline sector is coming, that could good competitor the scale of the dot.com bust, although amongst the worst effects beingness seen inwards the VC/private infinite rather than the listed infinite (although the latter volition also probable last badly affected). In many cases, valuations convey reached utterly absurd levels for loss making companies amongst unproven concern models, which rely on static analyses that are highly questionable inwards a dynamic world. As I convey argued inwards the past, consensus expectations for these companies are that they maintain to relish rapid revenue growth and rising profitability, whereas I intend inwards reality what nosotros volition meet is decelerating meridian describe growth in addition to falling profitability/widening losses. For those that are paying attention, it is apparent that this is already starting to happen.

Furthermore, at that spot are signs that an incipient reversal inwards the liquidity flywheel* that has propelled the growth of the VC 'asset class' inwards recent years is already underway, equally Softbank has failed to lift external working capital missive of the alphabet for its Vision Fund 2. If the liquidity flywheel decisively turns, a fairly catastrophic bust could ambit inwards the VC space, in addition to it remains to last seen if it volition last of sufficient size to tip the the States (and perchance choose other Western countries equally well) into recession. The magnitude of the pct losses realised yesteryear tech investors volition probable last equally large equally those realised yesteryear shale O&G investors over the yesteryear cycle, inwards my view, if non larger.


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*A 'liquidity flywheel' is the scream I give to the dynamic where fund inflows final result inwards working capital missive of the alphabet beingness deployed yesteryear those funds inwards a fashion that contributes to the cost of the assets they already ain beingness pushed up, thereby contributing to strong apparent returns. The strong reported returns so deed to drive additional inflows inwards a self-reinforcing fashion. This is how you lot terminate upwardly amongst worthless, loss-making companies similar WeWork attaining a valuation equally high equally US$47bn. 

Liquidity flywheels create an 'unstable equilibrium' that tin buy the farm on for a long time, but eventually turn, in addition to when they do, a discontinuity lawsuit happens in addition to the whole film is so played out inwards contrary (and unremarkably on fast-forward). Liquidity flywheels are a fundamental contributor - perchance the most of import contributor - to boom-bust property cost cycles inwards markets. 


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